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Resolving the Trade and Environment Conflict:
The WTO and NGO Consultative Relations
William M. Reichert
The World Trade Organization (WTO),' as successor to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 2 recognized
the need for environmentally responsible free trade. 3 Achieving
this will be difficult, however, as there are many obstacles to
overcome, both in international law, as well as in the WTO itself. Fortunately the WTO has also allowed for the establishment of consultative relations with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). 4 NGOs have made important contributions to other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) through
consultative relations and have been especially effective in the
environmental field.
This Note argues that the WTO can best pursue free trade
in accordance with principles of sustainable development
through consultative relations with NGOs. Part I discusses the
obstacles facing the WTO in its pursuit of sustainable development. Part II considers the nature and contributions of NGOs
and the various models of consultative relations. Part III explains why the WTO is the best international forum to address
sustainable development, and why NGO consultative status is
crucial for the pursuit of sustainable development. Part III also
addresses specific ways NGOs can effectively contribute to the
1. The WTO is a creation of the Uruguay Round negotiations, becoming
the new framework to conduct trade relations. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Document MTN/FA, Part II,
pages 1-14, of December 15, 1993; reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 5
(1995); 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO Charter].
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT].
3. WTO Charter, supra note 1, at pmbl. The WTO recognized the need for
free trade that is in accordance with the principles of sustainable development.
4. Article V.2 of the Charter reads: "The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO." WTO
Charter, supra note 1, at art. V.2.
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process. This note concludes that NGOs are invaluable in reconciling the trade and environment conflict.
I.

OBSTACLES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro5 connected environmental protection and
6
economic growth by emphasizing sustainable development.
Recognizing this trend, the WTO has noted the importance of
7
the conference's Declaration on Environment and Development
and has pledged to pursue a course of liberalized trade that allows for sustainable development.8 The WTO must overcome
several obstacles, however, to achieve this goal.
A.

OBSTACLES INHERENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

1.

Divergent Perspectives

Advocates of free trade and advocates of the environment
often view one another with suspicion and hostility. 9 The con5. For a brief description of the documents that came out of the conference, see Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, 31 I.L.M. 814, 814-17 (1992).
The texts of the documents may be found at 31 I.L.M. 874.
6. Sustainable development has been defined as "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1991). "At a minimum, sustainable development discourages the use of nonrenewable resources and activities that
adversely affect the quality of life for future generations." Kyle E. McSlarrow,
InternationalTrade and the Environment: Building a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, 21 ENvTL L. REP. 10,589, 10,590 (1991).
7. Decision on Trade and Environment, Document MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/lI
REV.1, reprinted in World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 469 (1995), noting Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
8. In the preamble to the WTO Charter, the parties to the agreement
recognize:
[Tihat their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development.
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at pmbl (emphasis added).
9. Environmentalists took an early stance that the GATT and the environment were fundamentally opposed to one another. See Michael B. Smith,
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flict appears to be rooted in the opposing philosophies behind
each side's policies. 10 International trade advocates seek to free
commerce from any type of barrier that might restrict the free
flow of goods. Environmentalists seek to conserve the earth's
natural resources and prevent exploitation of the ecosystem,"
often through restrictions that free traders condemn. The differences between these outlooks are made greater by the fact that
free trade and environmental advocates are generally specialists
in their respective fields, and may not have an adequate under12
standing of each other's agenda.
Another cause of the conflict is that the two sides' "emphasis
on domestic versus international issues is inverted. The trade
perspective, while international in context, focuses primarily on
the effect of domestic legislation. The environmental perspective, by contrast, has primarily a domestic agenda, but focuses
13
on the effects of internationalagreements among nations."
2.

International Law

Because environmental hazards do not respect artificial
political boundaries, domestic legislation often cannot effectively
address them.' 4 Unfortunately, the international legal system5
is also inadequately suited to solve environmental problems.'
Many critics feel that this is due to the emphasis on state sovereignty in international law, which guarantees states the right to
develop their natural resources' 6 and often allows a state to inGATT, Trade and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 533 (1993). "Many environmental organizations have been critical of the GATT as an agreement and as an
institution. They believe that the GATT views ecosystem protection as a nettlesome non-tariff barrier instead of an overriding goal." Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J. WORLD TRADE,
Oct. 1991, at 37, 37.
10. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,590.
11. Kurt C. Hofgard, Is This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts of Free
Trade Agreements on U.S. Environmental Protection, 23 ENVTL L. 635, 669
(1993).
12. Kyle E. McSlarrow, It's a Matter of Perspective, in, Making the GATT
Environmentally Correct, ENV'rL. F., July/Aug. 1992, at 22, 27.
13. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,590.
14. Maria Garner, TransnationalAlignment of Nongovernmental Organizations for Global EnvironmentalAction, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1057, 1061
(1991).
15. David Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of NonStates in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 9 PACE ENVrL L. REV. 475, 478
(1992).
16. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
art. 193, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (recognizing the right of every state to develop its natural water resources); Interim-
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flict injury upon the environment with virtually no fear of
17
reprisal.
The 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
the Soviet Union dramatically illustrated this gap in international law. The accident had a profound effect on millions of people and affected the citizens, property and environment of at
least twenty countries. 1 8 Despite the fact that customary international law provides for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities, 19 "not a single successful claim [was] brought against the
USSR, and this despite the USSR's implied acceptance of its
own negligence in the incident."20 Even if it were easier to
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2,
para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (encouraging nations to maximize the use of their
resources to increase the quality of life); Declaration on the Right to Development, Feb. 23, 1987, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. No. 53, art.
1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986) (declaring the right to development inalienable); General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Dec. 14, 1962, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., para. 1(1),
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1963).
17. Garner, supra note 14, at 1062. The principles of national sovereignty
and freedom of the seas permit a state to "degrade its own territory... [and] to
inflict injury on areas of the planet lying outside national territory virtually
without limit" subject only to fragmented and primitive rules of international
responsibility. Post-Stockholm: Influencing NationalEnvironmental Law and
PracticeThrough InternationalLaw and Policy, 66 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 1, 9
(1972) (statement of John Lawrence Hargrove).
18. Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International
Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L. J. 393, 402 (1989).
19. See Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting
from Exploration and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, Dec. 17, 1976,
art. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1450 (1977); Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, art. 2, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 189; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
art. 3, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, art. IV, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265; Claims Against the U.S.S.R. for
Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954 (Canada v. U.S.S.R), Jan. 23, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 899, 907 (stating that the principle of strict liability applies to activities
sharing a high degree of risk); see also Gunther Handl, State Liability for Accidental TransnationalEnvironmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 525, 558 (1980) (concluding that state liability for transboundary pollution derives from the presumption of state control over the injurious activity).
20. Sands, supra note 18, at 411. "The USSR is not a party to any of the
international conventions relating to third party liability in nuclear energy, and
is therefore not subject to any specific treaty obligation to compensate for damage caused outside its national boundaries." Id. at 407. See also Jillian Barron,
After Chernobyl: Liability for Nuclear Accidents Under InternationalLaw, 25
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 648 (1987) (stating that the Soviet Union admitted error, but denied any legal obligation). Sweden and Switzerland publicly
denied the existence of an international legal basis for securing damages from
the U.S.S.R. Gunther Handl et al., InternationalResponsibility for Manmade
Disasters, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 320, 331 (Apr. 8-11, 1987).
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bring a claim under international law, states often do not litigate the international rights of their citizens. 2 1 A state's interest in not exposing itself to future retributive claims frequently
prevails over the international community's
interest in enforc22
ing liability on the responsible state.
Another reason the international system has difficulty responding to environmental concerns is that the negotiating process is not open to non-state actors. "[O]ur leaders negotiate
treaties and participate in conventions while the rest of us are
left with little more than the ability to watch the continuing deterioration of our environment from the sidelines." 23 In contrast, U.S. legislation such as the Administrative Procedure
Act 2 4 and the Freedom of Information Act 25 ensures more ac-

countability than the often intractable multilateral organizations.26
"Disclosure and transparency are essential to
promoting a better development process." 2 7 Limiting international legal standing to states is incompatible with the modern
world. "The various developments since the two World Wars no
longer countenance the view that, as a matter of positive law,
States are the only subjects of International Law .... [Tihere
must be an increasing disposition to treat individuals, within a
28
limited sphere, as subjects of International Law."
21. Dinah Shelton, The ParticipationofNongovernmental Organizationsin
InternationalJudicialProceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 613 (1994).
22. Sands, supra note 18, at 407.
23. Rubinton, supra note 15, at 476 (citations omitted). This is due partly
to the fact that non-state actors (people, corporations, non-governmental organizations and so on) are not recognized as legal persons, and thus have no
standing at the international level. Sands, supra note 18, at 397.
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1989).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1989)
26. David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership:A Model
for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2653
(1991).
27. Bruce Stokes, Storming the Bank, 1988 NAT'L J. 3250, 3253 (statement
of Douglas Hellinger, co-director of the Development Group for Alternative Polides). The lack of transparency in the World Bank has prompted one commentator to describe the institution's decisionmaking procedures as highly
secretive. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2653.
28. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 639 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (citations omitted). This idea is just as prevalent
today as it was then:
To describe international society as comprising a community of states
is to ignore reality. As a matter of political fact, the time is long past in
which states alone acted as "subjects" of international law. New technologies have given non-state actors the virtually unrestricted power
to transmit satellite broadcasting signals across the globe, to transfer
within moments vast sums of capital between banks in different states,
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WTO

The original GATT allowed some environmental protection
measures, in Article XX, which allowed exceptions to GATT obligations if "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health, or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."2 9 Although Article XX was written in 1947, when environmental protection was not a major issue,3 0 the history of
Article XX indicates that it was intended to address environmental concerns. 3 1
The history of Article XX's interpretation, however, reveals
a considerable amount of confusion. 32 For example, there is
confusion over whether Article XX can be used to protect foreign
life or health. While most commentators have determined that
Article XX is limited to domestic life or health, others have argued that the provision was intended to apply to foreign conand to run industries and plants which pollute massively across international borders.
Sands, supra note 18, at 400.
29. The provisions of Article XX which are relevant to the environment are
the following:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health;... (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX.
30. Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 38. This is partly illustrated by the fact
that the word "environment" is not even mentioned in Article XX.
31. While there is no "legislative history" specifically for GATT Article XX,
earlier international discussions on an environmental exception for free trade
indicate that Article XX was intended to protect the environment. See
Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 38-47. In fact there was a general recognition of
an environmental exception to trade agreements as early as 1927. Id. at 42.
32. Id. at 49. See United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada GATT, BISD, 29th U.N. 108 (panel report adopted Feb.
22, 1982); Canada, European Community, Mexico/United States - US taxes on
petroleum and certain imported substances GATT, BISD, 34th U.N. 136 (panel
report adopted on June 17, 1987); Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon GATT, BISD 35th U.N. 114 (panel report
adopted March 22,1988); Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes GATT, BISD, 37th U.N. 200 (report adopted on November
7, 1990), Mexico/United States - United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT, BISD 39th U.N. 155 (report issued on September 3, 1991).
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cerns as well.3 3 All of this confusion has lead to the danger that
Article XX will become ineffective and make the WTO appear to
be an obstacle to environmental progress. 3 4 Because of this,
critics have charged that Article XX lacks relevance to current
scant support for resolving
environmental problems 35 and offers
36
trade and environment conflicts.
Another problem is that countries no longer have the ability
to block an environmentally adverse panel ruling. Under the
original GATT system, any member state could block an adverse
panel ruling, since unanimity was required to adopt a panel report (and thus even the losing party had to vote for its adoption).
Under the WTO, however, panel reports are automatically
adopted and it takes a negative consensus 3 7 to choose not to
adopt a panel report. 38 Environmentalists fear that this will
degrade
put pressure on domestic environmental regulation and
39
the current level of global environmental standards.
2.

Transparency

The GATT suffered a same lack of transparency that has
also been the subject of criticism in many other IGOs. 40 In fact,
some critics described the GATT as having "secret" trade negoti33. Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 52.
34. Id. at 55.
35. Smith, supra note 9, at 538.
36. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,594. One suggestion to make Article XX
more effective in protecting the environment is to change the phrase "necessary
to protect human, animal, or plant life or health" to a less stringent requirement of "relating to protection of human, animal, or plant life or health. Eliza
Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions,
21 ENVrL L. REP. 10,599, 10,602-03 (1991).
The requirement that a measure "relates to" protection of the environment should be met if the measure is consistent with, and a part of, the
framework of environmental policies of the nation imposing the measure. Such a "standard of proof" is sufficient to guard against the imposition of protectionist measures under the guise of environmental
protection and it preserves each country's right to decide its own environmental policies.
Id. at 10,603.
37. That is, the panel report is automatically adopted, unless there is a
unanimous vote not to adopt the report.
38. Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New
World Trade Organization:Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAw. 1095, 1099
(1994).
39. See U.S. Seeks Review of Tuna-DolphinDecision; Ruling Said to Underrnine Environmental Laws, Intl Envtl. Daily (BNA), May 25, 1994 (statement of David Schorr, trade policy specialist for the World Wildlife Fund)
available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAJED file.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
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ations which constituted "a sneak attack on democracy." 4 1 Recently, many have had reason to believe that the WTO will
follow the same course, despite the new provision allowing for
NGO consultative relations. In an effort to promote transparency, the Clinton administration lobbied during the Fall of
1994 for observer status for environment, development, and
business NGOs in the new WTO Trade and Environment Committee. 42 All other participating countries on the Committee
rejected the proposal, saying that the WTO is a governmental
organization and that NGOs have no place in it.4 3 Similarly,
applications for observer status by the Council of European and
Japanese National Shipping Associations and the American Institute of Maritime Shipping were received by the Working
Party on Maritime Transport of the WTO's Council on Services,
with Chairman Christer Manhusen saying that non-governmental organizations should use other forums to express their
views. 4 4 This stance is disturbingly at odds with the new provision allowing for consultative relations, as well as with recent
45
GATT-NGO cooperation.

41.

Sabotage! of America's Health, Food Safety and EnvironmentalLaws,
Apr. 22, 1992, at A18.
42. U.S. Fails to Bring NGOs Into Talks With WTO's Environmental Committee, 17 Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 762 (Sept. 21, 1994). "NGOs have much expertise to offer in the field of the environment, and their voice can help the
committee in its exploration of the link between trade and the environment,"
U.S. delegate Chris Marcich told the committee.
Marcich told the meeting the United States believes co-opting NGOs into
the work of the committee would make its work more transparent. "Non-transparent proceedings perpetuate a fortress image of the (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) and diminish public confidence in and support for the work
of the WTO." Id.
43. Id. Interestingly, in 1971, the General Council of the GATT' established
the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, whose mission
was similar to the WTO Trade and Environment Committee. The group never
met until 1991, and its failure is often cited by environmentalists as a sign of
the GATT's lack of resolve to deal with environmental issues. See GATT to
Focus on Trade and Environmental Link, GATT Focus, Oct. 1991, at 1 [hereinafter GATT Focus].
44. U.S. Urges Broad Representation on Investigative Dispute Panels, 12
Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 295 (Feb. 15, 1995).
45. In June of 1994, the GATT organized a symposium of more than 500
representatives of industry, governments, and non-governmental organizations
to exchange views on how to wipe out the anomalies inherent in the relationship between trade and the environment. Symposium Addresses Ways New
WTO Could Erase Trade, Environment Anomolies, 17 Int'l Envtl Rep. (BNA)
503 (June 15, 1994).
WASH. POST,
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NGOs

NGOs have existed since the nineteenth century. 46 Because they are extremely varied in their makeup, however, there
is no consensus as to what an NGO is. The United Nations has
broadly defined an NGO as, "any international organization
47
which is not established by inter-governmental agreement."
In its definition, however, the United Nations erroneously assumes that NGOs are exclusively international groups. 48 When
speaking only of international nongovernmental organizations,
the acronym INGO is more accurate, and avoids possible exclusion of domestic groups from NGO status. The acronym NGO is
broader than INGO, and can include both domestic and interna49
tional groups.
While some have argued for an even broader definition of an
NGO, 50 the Union of International Associations (UIA), with
whom NGOs are registered for the United Nations, has set out a
much narrower definition. The UIA has established criteria for
an organization to be defined as an NGO: (1) it must have aims
which are truly international in character and manifest the intention to engage in activities in at least three states; (2) the
membership must be drawn from individuals or collective entities of at least three states and must be open to any appropriately qualified individual or entity in the organization's area of
operations; (3) the constitution must provide for the members
to periodically elect the governing body and officers; (4) the
headquarters and the officers should be rotated among the various member states at designated intervals; the voting procedure
must be structured in such a way as to prevent control of the
organization by any one national group; and substantial finan46. The first NGO is considered to be the World's Evangelical Alliance,
founded in 1846. WERNER J.

FELD & ROBERT S. JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 25 (1994). For an excellent account of the history of NGOs, see DouGLAS WILLIAMS, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 259-69

(1987).

47.

E.

OsMANCzYK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTER-

NATIONAL RELATIONS 565 (1990).

48. This is a common mistake when discussing NGOs. See, e.g. KIell Skjelsbaeck, The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the
Twentieth Century, 25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 420, 422 (1971) (abbreviating international nongovernmental organizations with the acronym NGO); see also infra
text accompanying notes 50-52.
49. See FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at xvii-xviii.
50. One scholar has expanded the definition by considering the representation of members from only two states to be sufficient if at least one of the representatives is not a government official. Skjelsbaeck, supra note 48, at 422.
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cial contributions to the budget must come from sources in at
least three states.5 1 This more specific definition, which also
fails to consider domestic NGOs, would actually exclude many
international societies in North America, "since their funds are
52
usually derived wholly from U.S. members."
A satisfactory definition of an NGO probably lies somewhere between the broad U.N. definition and the stricter UIA
one. There are likely to be some exceptions, however, due to the
wide variety of NGOs and the broad range of purposes that they
serve.5 3 Although there are great differences among the various definitions of an NGO, there seems to be general agreement
among scholars that most NGOs are private, voluntary, nonprofit organizations which may be local, national, or international in nature. 54 Some NGOs are basically international professional bodies; some have exclusively educational or research
purposes. Others have more philanthropic interests such as the
resolution of social problems, development in poor countries,
human rights, and the environment. 55 NGOs often act by fulfilling a number of duties, such as: advocacy of special interests of
public importance; providing expert advice in areas in which
governments have an interest, but in which their own resources
of information are i.adequate; acting as executing agents for a
number of U.N. Agencies operating in developing countries; and
publicizing the work of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies .56

A.

NGO

PARTICIPATON THROUGH CONSULTATIVE RELATIoNs

NGO participation has been most prominent in the United
Nations, particularly through its specialized agencies. NGOs
51. 3 UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1733-34 (12th ed. 1994-1995).
52.

FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 22.
53. Some NGOs for example, even have government-related memberships,
such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the

International Union of Official Travel Organizations. FELD & JORDAN, supra
note 46, at 24.
54. Farouk Mawlawi, New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role
for Non-GovernmentalActors, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 391, 392 (1993). See also Karen
J. Jason, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizationsin InternationalElection Observing, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1795, 1798 (1992); David Weissbrodt, The Contribution of InternationalNongovernmental Organizationsto the
Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 403, 406-408 (Theodor Merton ed., 1984).
55. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 76 (1992); WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 263.

56.

WILLIAMS,

supra note 46, at 265.
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participate in the United Nations under Article 71 of the U.N.
Charter which allows for consultative relations between the
58
57
U.N. Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and NGOs.
The main purposes for the consultative arrangements within the
U.N. system are to: (1) secure advice and technical cooperation
from competent NGOs, (2) enable organizations that represent
important elements of public opinion in many states to express
their views, and (3) advance the objectives of the U.N. system
through promotional activities and projects of NGOs. 59 Because
of its extensive experience with NGOs, the U.N. model of con60
sultative relations is enlightening.
In implementing Article 71, the United Nations divided
NGOs into three categories according to the interest of the organization in the work of ECOSOC.6 1 NGOs placed into Category I are deemed to "[be] concerned with most of the activities
of the Council,... have marked and sustained contributions to
make to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations"
and have considerable membership that is "representative of
62
major segments of population in a large number of countries."
NGOs in Category I may attend meetings of ECOSOC, submit
written statements, be granted hearings before ECOSOC, and
propose agenda items for consideration. Category II NGOs are
those whose competence lies in only a few of the fields of activity
covered by ECOSOC. These NGOs have all of the privileges of
those in Category I, except the right to propose agenda items.
The third category is the Roster, intended for NGOs that can
57. While ECOSOC was originally supposed to handle economic and social
matters within the United Nations, its influence has not been as great as many
had expected. Since all NGO activity is channeled through ECOSOC, NGOs
have suffered from ECOSOC's failuRes. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 223.
58. Article 71 of the U.N. Charter reads: The Economic and Social Council
may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where
appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of
the United Nations concerned. U.N. Charter art. 71. For a history of NGO consultative relations with the United Nations, see Michael M. Gunter, Toward a
Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental
Organizations? 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 557 (1977).
59. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 224.
60. Moreover, the language providing for consultative relations in Article
V.2 of the WTO Charter, is quite similar to that of Article 71 of the U.N. Charter. See supra notes 4 and 58.
61. Arrangementsfor Consultationwith Non-Governmental Organizations,
U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1296(XLIV), 44th Sess., U.N. No. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548
(1968).
62. Id.
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make occasional and useful contributions. Those on the Roster
have extremely limited privileges, including the right to attend
meetings and the right to submit (substantially shorter) written
statements. Many U.N. specialized agencies have also established consultative relations with NGOs. While some have followed the ECOSOC classification scheme,6 3 many others simply
maintain one single list of NGOs.64
NGO consultative relations in the United Nations have
been severely criticized as weak and ineffective,6 5 and the
ECOSOC classification system has been described as artificial
and impractical. 66 Moreover, in the past, consultative relations
have suffered from a lack of communication between NGOs and
the various branches of the United Nations, which is exacerbated by the vast number of NGOs that often clog the channels
of communication. 6 7 The fact that NGOs have no access to the
General Assembly, which often deals with the substantive matters of concern to NGOs, further compounds the communication
problem. 68 Finally, there have long been complaints that NGOs
from wealthy, western countries dominate activities, and that
there is a lack of geographical balance. 69 Despite the shortcomings of consultative relations, overall NGO involvement in the
U.N. system has been highly successful. "I have seen countless
examples of the practical contribution which NGOs can and do
make to our work.... Indeed, wherever one looks at the work of
the United Nations, one sees how valuable is the contribution
which is being made by NGOs." 70 The same success is true of
63. These agencies follow the ECOSOC classification scheme: The United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Labor Organization (ILO).
FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 224-25.
64. These agencies simply classify all NGOs together: the World Health
Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organizations (ICAO),
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
Gunter, supra note 58, at 570-71.
65.

FELD & JoRDAN, supra note 46, at 222.

66. Gunter, supra note 58, at 579.
67. Id. at 580-81.
68. Id. at 581.
69. Jason, supra note 53, at 1830; Gunter, supra note 58, at 582.
70. Gunter, supra note 58, at 572 (quoting Message from the Secretary-General to the Regional Conference of NGO's Organized by the Office of PublicInfor-
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NGO relations with other international organizations, "in fact,
in some instances, the work of [IGOs] could not go forward without the participation of [NGOsI."71
B.

NGO CONTRIBUTIONS TO IGOs

One of the most important NGO functions is to act as a link
to the public. Originally, the United Nations envisioned that
NGOs "would bring to the deliberations of the U.N. a cross section of world public opinion." 7 2 This connection to the public
also works conversely: "The United Nations needs the support of
public opinion in all its efforts ... The United Nations cannot
enter the public relations business, but that is a role which the
non-governmental organizations can assume." 73 Perhaps the
most important NGO function, however, is the gathering, evaluation, and dissemination of information. 74 In fact, many NGOs
base their credibility on information that is often more detailed,
and available for longer periods of time, than that accumulated
by states and IGOs. 75 Consequently, NGO reports often become
the basis of official discussion. 7 6 NGOs are very effective in using this information to lobby the media and influence public
opinion, especially at international conferences. 7 7 In recent
years, this has been a significant factor in raising public awareness about the major issues at conferences such as the U.N. Conmation of the United Nations in Cooperation with the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand (May 27-29, 1975),

reprinted in 28 INT'L AFF. 282 (1976)).
71. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 217.
72. EDwIN A. BOCK, REPRESENTATION OF NON-GovERNMENTAL

ORGANIZA-

TIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (1955).

73. Statement of former Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, quoted in Edward J. Lacey, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizationsin World Affairs,
TRANSNAT'L ASS'NS,

May-June 1988, at 138, 139 (citing Report of Annual Con-

ference of the Non-Governmental OrganizationsListed with the United Nations
Office of Public Information 10 (1972)).

74. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 229. NGOs use many methods to
gather information: reading relevant laws, reviewing periodicals, studying documents, contacting individuals, and pursuing on-site investigations. Weissbrodt, supra note 53, at 404. NGOs can serve as information brokers to delegates

at international conferences, and have a major impact on the decision making
process. A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Development of InternationalLaw, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 68 (1993).

75.

"[I]f such organizations [i.e. NGOs] are to be successful, their research

must be perceived as independent, credible, and accessible." Note, Developments in the Law - InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1484,
1533 (1991) [hereinafter Developments].

76. Jason, supra note 53, at 1800.
77. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 234.
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ference on Environment and Development in 1992,78 and the
79
recent U.N. Conference on Women in Beijing.
NGOs also make more direct contributions to IGOs, offering
valuable advice and technical assistance based on the experience of their members.8 0 NGO members were recruited by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (TAEA) to monitor Iraq's
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, and have
worked with IGOs and individual states to ameliorate starvation in Somalia.8 1 It is often easier for NGOs to monitor compliance with international standards and rules since unlike IGOs,
82
they do not need an invitation to enter a country and observe.
Moreover, because they possess no formal ties to any government, NGOs are often more vocal in their opinions, whereas
IGOs usually try to remain as apolitical as possible. 83 Such
scrutiny can be very effective, because governments are sensitive to criticism of their policies, especially in an international
forum.8 4
Because they can make so many contributions to

78.

Hazel Henderson, At Rio, NGOs Were Again Out in Front, CHRISTIAN
June 25, 1992, at 19.
79. Abigail Abrash & Laurel Fletcher, ... And an Unhelpful U.N., WASH.
POST, Oct. 1, 1995 at C7. NGOs have been involved, however, in U.N. conferences for a number of years. "[T]hree recent examples, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the World Population Conference, and the
World Food Conference, have demonstrated that positive contributions can result from the closer involvement of non-governmental organizations in the work
of the United Nations." Report of the Secretary-GeneralIn Response to Recommendations of the Committee and of Economic and Social Council Resolutions
1739 (LIV) and 1740 (LIV), U.N. Doc. E/C.2/768, at 3-4 (1975) (Statement of
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim).
80. Jason, supra note 53, at 1817-18. This technical assistance can be
quite significant. According to a survey, the external assistance provided by
NGOs to low-income states in 1973 was estimated to be over $1 billion. FELD &
JORDAN, supra note 46, at 226.
81. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 218. NGOs often provide direct relief in the form of food, blankets, medicine, and education. Weissbrodt, supra
note 53, at 425.
82. Jason, supra note 53, at 1819. They can be somewhat limited in this
respect, however, depending on their financial resources, which are usually
much smaller than that of IGOs.
83. Id. at 1818-19.
84. This seems to hold true for every kind of government, from open democracies to dictatorships, from the United States to the former Soviet Union to
Guatemala. Weissbrodt, supra note 53, at 410-12. For example, in response to
criticism over human rights abuses from the International Commission of Jurists, the Chilean government responded through a series of half-page advertisements in the New York Times and Washington Post. Id. at 411 n. 42.
SCI. MONITOR,
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IGOs, "for many8 5issue areas . .. [NGOs] are now essential adjuncts of IGOs."
Although NGOs have traditionally lacked standing in international judicial proceedings,8 6 more and more courts are beginning to recognize NGOs as amicus participants in
international cases.8 7 While amicus briefs add to a court's
workload, they accept them because of their benefits. Amicus
briefs offer a more detailed analysis of law and legislative history than that offered by the parties; arguments that the parties
may be unwilling to make due to political considerations; and
knowledge of the broader implications of decisions than the parties may have considered, as well as other expert knowledge.8 8
Consequently, many international courts now recognize the legitimacy of non-state actors in their cases.8 9
NGOs also possess diplomatic skills that governments and
IGOs often lack. In many situations, bilateral or multilateral
negotiations may be ineffective or impossible due to hostility between the parties or because of the bias of government representatives in presenting their own views. In these cases,
unofficial mediation 90 by an NGO can be a more effective solu85. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 246. NGOs have become important
in electoral monitoring, see generally Jason, supra note 53, and have made a
significant contribution to conflict mediation. See Mawlawi, supra note 53, at
392. This is especially true of the American Friends Service Committee and the
British Friends - best known as the Quakers. They have been active in many
areas, including: the Middle East in 1955 and 1967; between the two Germanys
from 1962 to 1973; during the 1965 India-Pakistan war; and the Nigeria-Biafra
war from 1968-69. Id. at 395.
86. "The ability of a nongovernmental organization to initiate an international case or intervene as a party is limited because in many international
courts only states may be parties to proceedings." Shelton, supra note 21, at
612.
87. Id. at 616.
88. Id. at 618. Amicus filings at the United States Supreme Court in the
late 1960s and early 1970s were present in 63.8 percent of noncommercial
cases. Id.
89. The regional "international" legal systems of the European Community
and the Nordic Community have both recognized the legal personality of NGOs.
Sands, supra note 18, at 413. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the United Nations Compensation
Commission, established after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, have all recognized non-state participants. Shelton, supra note 21, at 612 n.2. The European
Court of Justice accepts amicus curiae, as does the European Court of Human
Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has extensive amicus participation, and has even begun to accept NGO oral participation. Id. at 628640.
90. Unofficial mediation is defined as "mediation in international disputes
by persons who are not employed by or responsible to a national government or
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tion.91 An NGO's role as a mediator often stems from its involvement in related activities and a comprehensive knowledge
and understanding of the issues. 9 2 Moreover, they may be able
to offer a more politically neutral assessment of the dispute, as
93
well as a unique perspective toward its resolution.
C.

NGO

CONTRIBUTIONS TO

HUMAN

RIGHTS AND THE

ENVIRONMENT

NGOs have achieved remarkable results in the area of
human rights. 94 Since World War II, a great proliferation of
NGOs has been partly responsible for the emergence of human
rights as a major international issue.95 In fact, according to the
former Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights, the inclusion of human rights in the U.N. Charter was the "result of the
insistence of nongovernmental organizations and individuals at
the San Francisco Conference. It is a matter of record that had
it not been for the determined role played by these organizations
and individuals, the place assigned to human rights in the Charter might have been less pronounced." 9 6 Others have stated
that they were partly responsible for the fall of authoritarian
regimes in Eastern Europe. 9 7 The activities of a number of
NGOs have been at the forefront in monitoring the status of
human rights. 98 They have caused executions to be stayed, torture to be stopped, prisoners to be released, and have raised the
general awareness of the fundamental rights of citizens. 9 9
an inter-governmental organization." Sydney D. Bailey, Non-official Mediation
in Disputes: Reflections on Quaker Experience, 61 INT'L AFF. 205 (1985).
91. Mawlawi, supra note 53, at 396-97.
92. Id. at 401. Moreover, as a mediator, their political status is less likely
to be of concern, since they will not have the same bias as that of the conflicting
parties, nor will they have to worry about political tradeoffs in finding a solution. See Tarlock, supra note 74, at 65.
93. See Mawlawi, supra note 53, at 398-99.
94. See Weissbrodt, supra note 53, for a general discussion of NGO activity
in the field of human rights. NGOs have also been very active in the related
field of disarmament. See FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 231-33.
95. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 227.
96. Id. (quoting Theo van Boven, opening of the 36th session of the Commission on Human Rights (1980)).
97. Symposium, Transitionsto Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 Am. U.J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 965, 979 (1990) (remarks of Hugo Fruhling).
98. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 228.
99. Weissbrodt, supra note 53, at 411. For example, Chile released several
hundred political prisoners in 1976 in response to U.N. and NGO criticism. Id.
at 419 n.79. In fact, the NGO, Amnesty International, has been responsible for
helping to release thousands of political prisoners and raise overall consciousness regarding human rights abuses. Id. at 427-28.
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Some of the larger and more prominent human rights NGOs,
such as Amnesty International10 0 and the International Committee of the Red Cross, have been instrumental in drafting
human rights law. 10 1
NGOs have also been very successful in working to protect
the environment. 0 2 "In many respects, [NGOs] have come to
be the primary source of expression for the international desire
to protect the environment, and number among its most effective guardians." 0 3 They have been vital to the development of
domestic environmental law,' 0 4 and have made major accomplishments internationally as well. For example, the NGO
Friends of the Earth convinced the Commission of the European
Communities to investigate the United Kingdom's proposal for
privatization of the water industry.' 0 5 Similarly, Greenpeace of
Luxembourg helped get a judgment by the European Court of
Justice to temporarily shut down a nuclear power plant that
06
failed to comply with European Community procedures.'
100. Amnesty International's contribution to human rights earned it the
1977 Nobel Peace Prize.
101. Amnesty International played a major role in the elaboration of the
U.N. Declaration of the Protection of All Persons Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1979), and the Red
Cross was instrumental in developing the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 228.
102. Interestingly, the environment and human rights share some commonalties with regard to international law:
Although rights and obligations at international law have traditionally
run to states and not directly to individuals, commentators have documented the recognition of limited international legal personality for individuals - particularly in the context of human rights - as well as
the emergence of a 'new human right to a healthful and decent environment.' Intergovernmental agreements proclaim the principle that
environmental rights and obligations run to individuals, and clearly it
is 'human beings and not legal constructions, such as States, [that] suffer from the degradation of the environment.'
Developments, supra note 75, at 1600 (footnotes omitted) (quoting W. GORMLEY,
HuMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERA-

TION 2 (1976), and Hull & Koers, Introduction to a Convention on the International Environmental Protection Agency, 1971 LAW OF THE SEA INST. I, IX

(Occasional Paper No. 12)).
103. Sands, supra note 18, at 394.
104. See 135 Cong. Rec. S1392 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Chafee, stating that non-governmental organizations' ability to bring suit in the
United States are vital to ensure that Congress properly implements and courts
fully enforce environmental laws). "Recent studies indicate that amici have had
a significant impact on the development of constitutional and environmental
law within the United States." Shelton, supra note 21, at 616.
105. EC Warning on Future Standards of UK Water, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1989, at 2.
106. See Case 187/87, Saarland v. Ministry of Industry 1988 E.C.R. 5013.
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NGOs also play an increasingly important role in the negotiation, ratification, implementation and enforcement of international environmental agreements; their presence at these
agreements has become routine. 10 7 They have been present at
the Framework Convention on Climate Change,1 0 8 as well as
the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. 10 9 More
recently, NGOs were very influential at the U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio De Janeiro. More than
7,000 NGOs gathered at the Global Forum, an NGO-organized
counterconference. 1" 0 NGOs had a great effect on the international press corps and worked hard to influence legislators,
many of whom attended the Global Forum.'
One NGO which merits special attention is the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), also known
as the World Conservation Union. By its fortieth anniversary in
1988, its remarkably diverse membership included sixty-one
states and 128 government bodies, 383 national and thirty-three
international NGOs, and a few affiliated members. 1 2 The
IUCN has an Environmental Law Centre in Bonn and convenes
a triennial General Assembly of its members, where it passes
resolutions which are then presented to governments and other
relevant bodies. 113 Early on, the IUCN perceived the need to
link the environment and development, and provide knowledge
and leadership for sustainable development." 4 It helps governments develop international declarations and conventions,
sometimes providing first drafts through its Environmental Law
Centre, and has been an important player in several interna5
tional environmental conferences and conventions."
107. Edith Brown Weiss, InternationalEnvironmental Law: Contemporary
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 675, 693 (1993).
108. Id. (citing Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849).
109. See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Treaty Regarding the
Antarctic, June 21, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 22, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 30
I.L.M. 1455, 1460 (stating that representatives of "international governmental
and non-governmental organizations attended the Meeting as observers").
110. FELD & JORDAN, supra note 46, at 236-40.
111. Id.
112. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 55, at 77-78.
113. Id.
114. The RUCN prepared the "IUCN/WWF/UNEP World Conservation
Strategy, published in 1980, in which FAO and Unesco also collaborated. This
lays down principles for conservation of living resources and for legal developments which will enable their sustainable utilization." Id. at 78.
115. "[The IUCN] has worked on a Convention on Preservation of Biological
Diversity and an Earth Charter or Declaration for adoption by the UNCED, and
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NGOs successfully lobbied the World Bank to improve their
environmental record. 1 16 The Bank admits making serious errors in the past by funding projects that severely damaged the
environment. For example, a $112 million irrigation and resettlement project in Kenya resulted in tropical forest destruction,
contamination of drinking water, and rampant disease. The
Bank's own evaluation of the project declared it an environmental disaster. 11 7 Similarly, a colonization project in northwest
Brazil had disastrous consequences, and prompted the Bank's
president to admit error.'
Bank senior vice president, Moeen
Qureshi, has said, "Our progress against poverty, after 40 years
of effort, has been disappointing. The Bank and NGOs can and
must work together." 119
In response, NGOs have lobbied
against the Bank's environmentally risky ventures and have encouraged the Bank to take a more environmentally conscious approach to development.1 20 Despite initial hostility, the Bank
has expressed an appreciation for working with NGOs. According to vice president Qureshi, "We can not achieve quality results without the active, creative and critical involvement of
many NGOs."' 21 Another Bank official has stated, "The Bank's
renewed emphasis on [combating] poverty is partly in response
to NGO concerns .. . [and] [t]he Bank's increased emphasis on
environment is, even more clearly, in response to NGO
122
concerns."
III. PURSUING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH NGO CONSULTATIVE RELATIONS
Environmental problems have serious implications for individuals within an immediate region, and in other parts of the
has previously contributed to the 1972 World Heritage Convention, the 1973
Convention on Trade in Endangered Species, the 1971 Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance, and the 1979 Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals." Id.
116. See also infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
117. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2649 n.17.
118. Id.
119. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3253.
120. For example, the Washington-based NGO Results rallied pressure on
the Bank to conduct a poverty impact assessment before lending money. In
response, the Bank created an antipovery task force. Id. at 3251. Concerned
about a loan for a Brazil nuclear power development, German NGOs pressured
the West German government to ask that the loan be postponed. Id.
121. Id. at 3250 (statement of Bank senior vice president Moeen Qureshi).
122. Id. (according to an internal Bank document on Bank-NGO
cooperation).
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world. Consequently, "we are in a situation that calls not only
for implementation of existing principles but also for a new approach, through the development of new principles of international law." 123 Sustainable development is vital to prosperity in
the next century, but unfortunately, "[tihe few mechanisms that
purport to address both trade and environmental policies are
woefully inadequate to that task."124 There has recently been
support in the GATT to take up environmental concerns,' 2 5 and
the new WTO may be the best vehicle to address trade and the
environment together.' 26 As one commentator has put it:
In the next two decades, the joining of environmental protection and
economic development will grow. The burgeoning new field of environment and trade reflects this linkage. While trade law has operated
under the relatively unified and broad framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for more than forty years, fledgling
international environmental law still consists only of many separate
and disparate legal instruments. It is not surprising then that most
environment and trade
issues are discussed almost exclusively within
12 7
the GATT context.

In seeking to achieve sustainable development, however, the
WTO needs to consult with NGOs.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
states that "[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the
123. Declaration of the Hague (March 11, 1989), reprinted in Sands, supra
note 18, at 418. Some have even gone so far as to suggest giving legal rights to
the environment itself. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
Supreme Court Justice Douglas has reiterated this view: "The critical question
of 'standing' would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we. .. allowed
environmental issues to be litigated.., in the name of the inanimate object
about to be despoiled, defaced or invaded...." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 741 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,589. "[T]he international system, in
which states are the primary actors, has been criticized as being 'unecological'
and unprepared to handle global environmental problems. The need to restructure international institutions to provide an effective response to global environmental problems has long been recognized and is still being championed
today." Rubinton, supra note 15, at 478 (citations omitted).
125. The United States, Mexico, and the European Community all expressed support in 1991 for the revival of the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade. See GATT Focus, supra note 43, at 2.
126. See, e.g., McSlarrow, supra note 6, at 10,593, "An international regime
that provides principles that squarely address both environmental protection
and growth is necessary in order to ensure that both goals are maximized...
[GATT] offers the best available vehicle for a resolution of their tensions." Id.
See also Smith, supra note 9, at 544 (suggesting that the GATT is a logical
forum to address rules on trade and the environment).
127. Weiss, supra note 104, at 707-08 (citation omitted).
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participation of all concerned citizens." 128 Since individuals are
excluded from international participation, IGOs commonly turn
to NGOs to reflect the interests of the people. 12 9 In this role,
NGOs have become "the environment's moral, if not legal,
guardians." 3 0 Because of this, "[tihe political role of non-governmental organizations... should be expressly recognized by
governments, and these groups should then be given an increased legal role."'13 Unless NGOs assume an expanded role,
we risk the same kind of political inaction that followed the dis32
aster at Chernobyl.'

A.

IMPROVING UPON THE

U.N.

MODEL

The NGO classification systems employed by the U.N. and
its specialized agencies can be used as models for NGO classification in the WTO. 133 These systems, however, do suffer certain shortcomings1 3 4 which can be improved upon. To avoid
clogging the system with too many NGOs,' 3 5 there should be a
grant of temporary consultative status to NGOs that only have
128. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 7, at princ. 10. This idea was reaffirmed at the London
Conference on Saving the Ozone Layer, March 5-7, 1989, by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She stated that environmental problems are not "for
governments alone. It would require co-operation with science and industry
and the understanding and participation of individuals." Thatcher Calls for
Stricter Targets, FIN. TIMEs., Mar. 6, 1989, at 12.
129. Sands, supra note 18, at 401.
130. Id. at 412.
While four decades ago we could speak of an international system focused almost exclusively on nation-states and their subunits, today the
system includes national governments (and local governments), intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations as
essential components constantly interacting. NGOs are likely to continue to expand their influence.... The information revolution should
greatly facilitate this increased role of NGOs in international environmental decisionmaking.
Weiss, supra note 107, at 709.
131. Sands, supra note 18, at 395 n.12.
132. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. In fact, NGOs wishing to
participate in WTO matters could be classified according to their classification
with ECOSOC. This has been suggested as well for the International Court of
Justice, since "such status provides some evidence of the broad representation
and interests of the organization, as well as indicates a degree of familiarity
with the international system. In addition, it provides a straightforward criterion to limit the potential pool of [participants]...." Shelton, supra note 21, at
642.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
135. Similar concerns have caused the ICJ to refuse NGO participation.
The Registrar of the Court stated that it was "unwilling to open the floodgates
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peripheral relations with the WTO, but are concerned with one
particular item.' 3 6 A system of periodic review of consultative
status could serve to demote or remove those NGOs whose involvement has declined, and promote those NGOs whose inMoreover, the WTO should
volvement has increased. 13 7
encourage NGOs to work together in preparing and submitting
joint statements, to avoid repetition and reduce volume.' 3 8 The
U.N. suffers from a lack of communication with NGOs' 3 9 which
the WTO needs to guard against in its consultative relations.
One way to do this is to designate officials in the Secretariat,
each of the four Councils, the various Committees and other
sub-units, to act as contacts with NGOs.' 40 Additionally, each
allowing
party to the WTO could appoint an NGO ambassador,
141
for direct input with each national delegation.
The WTO needs to ensure that NGOs are politically and financially independent from governmental influence. "[A]n NGO
should be in a position to constructively criticize governmental
policy and should not feel inhibited in doing so by danger of los[It] should assure its autonomous
ing its financial basis ....
In
existence before turning to government assistance." 14 2
1967, this problem was illustrated by accusations of undue governmental influence over NGOs in the United Nations. These
accusations forced ECOSOC to tighten the requirements for conwere not totally insultative status and expel any NGOs that
14 3
dependent from their home governments.
The WTO must strike a delicate geographical balance in
NGO representation to avoid the usual domination by Western
NGOs.' 4 4 There must also be a representational balance between competing interests, to avoid accusations of unequal
14
influence.
to what might be a vast amount of proffered assistance." Correspondence of the
Registrar to Prof. Reisman, 1970 ICJ Pleadings (2 Legal Consequences) 638-39.
136. See Gunter, supra note 58, at 583.
137. See id. at 584.
138. See id. at 585.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
140. See Gunter, supra note 58, at 584.
141. See id.
142. JAMES E. KNOTT JR., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY OF THE ROLE
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING COUNTRIES 68 (1962).

143. Gunter, supra note 58, at 564-65.
144. Id. at 585-86; Jason, supra note 53, at 1830-32

145. See generally Lewis Rosman, Public Participationin InternationalPesticide Regulation: When the Codex Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?, 12
VA. ENVTL L.J. 329 (1993) (discussing the dominance of industry group partici-
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Most importantly, the WTO must use caution when granting consultative status, since some NGOs can hinder the process
in pursuit of their own agendas. "[O]fficials... are in a state of
more or less perpetual irritation with the environmentalists for
what is often seen as their demand for absolutes, their unwillingness or inability to comprehend the reality of international
politics, and the processes of negotiation among sovereign
states." 14 6 The WTO must be careful to limit the participation
of those NGOs that do not respect the political realities of international relations.
WTO officials who oppose NGO involvement are correct in
saying that the WTO is a governmental organization. 147 As a
former U.N. Secretary-General said regarding NGOs, "It should
be emphasized that the consultative relationship does not imply
the intervention of non-governmental organizations in the decision-making process that is the proper domain of Governments.' 48 WTO officials are mistaken, however, if they believe
that NGOs cannot make valuable contributions to the WTO.
B.

WORKING WITH

NGOs

"Environmental policy-making is only as good as its primary information system." 4 9 To harmonize trade policy decisions with principles of sustainable development, the WTO
should turn to NGOs as reliable sources of information.' 5 0 Governments and IGOs often do not have sufficient resources to
gather the information that is essential to a sound environmental decision. This, however, is often the primary work product of
environmental NGOs. For example, concerning a recent case in
the International Court of Justice, one commentator stated:
[Ilt is not clear that the parties have the resources or information from
long-term monitoring that would provide a fill assessment of the potential environmental harm from the project. Such information is essential to the case . . . [and] is available, from nongovernmental

organizations that have been monitoring the [area] for years.151

NGOs can serve as valuable information brokers to the WTO.
Such information can be useful in determining ecological stanpation to the detriment of consumer participation in the Codex Alimentarius

negotiations).
146.
147.

PHILIP W. QuiGG, A POLE APART 179 (1983).
See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.

148.

U.N. Doc. E/C.2/768, at 3 (1975).

149. ROBERT A. SmNN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLrrIcs OF MARINE POLLUTION
CONTROL 124 (1974).

150.
151.

See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
Shelton, supra note 21, at 626.
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dards for sustainable development. 152 Moreover, the WTO
could turn to NGOs (such as the IUCN and its Environmental
Law Centre) to formulate policies on sustainable development. 15 3 It could also encourage these NGOs to offer assistance
to states and government officials who wish to harmonize their
15 4
trade and environment policies.
The WTO can ask NGOs to develop environmental impact
assessments of proposed trade measures which may impact the
environment, or conversely, on environmental measures which
may impact free trade. 55 Environmental impact assessments
allow the public to access information concerning how proposed
measures will effect the environment before such measures are
adopted. This would facilitate public discussion outside of the
WTO before measures are implemented, permitting the WTO to
more accurately measure public opinion. This could also improve the public's opinion of the WTO 56 and avoid much of the
controversy over environmental matters that plagued the
GATT.157
The WTO can also improve its global image by using NGOs
as a link to the public. 15 8 "Because their activities implicate the
interests of thousands of local, national, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) environmental IGOs consider the public's views primarily by granting nonvoting
observer or consultative status to NGOs."' 5 9 The WTO can im152. Garner, supra note 14, at 1080.
153. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
154. See Garner, supra note 14, at 1079.
155. For a general discussion of environmental impact assessment, see
Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. R.v. 591 (1992). The U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988) contains an
environmental impact assessment provision at § 4332(2)(C).
156. "Greater involvement of non-State actors can bring useful information
to the decision making process and thus improve the scientific credibility and,
in turn, the effectiveness of the resulting rules." Developments, supra note 75,
at 1602.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. Etienne Vernet of the Parisbased Collective for Environment has stated that the WTO is not the proper
forum to discuss environmental concerns. He feels that environmental concerns are not being woven into the process and that government representatives are neither competent nor authorized to raise environmental concerns.
He stated, "As long as liberalization of trade will rhyme with de-regulation or
the protection of some economic interests, all initiatives to protect the environment and achieve social equity will be undermined." Inter Press Service, Dec.
10, 1993 available in LEXIS, News library, INPRES file.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
159. Developments, supra note 75, at 1588 (citation omitted).
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prove its transparency by using NGOs to inform and influence
the public, and by encouraging them to disseminate information
concerning its policies and proceedings. 160 The WTO could allow NGOs to have observer status at sessions of the Ministerial
Conference, the various councils and committees, and the Dispute Settlement Body. 161 Those NGOs attending will then be
able to relay their observations to the general public, making the
WTO more transparent than the GATT.162
The Dispute Settlement Body could utilize NGO input, not
only for information on environmental matters, but also in the
case of proving damage to the environment, or a loss in trade
benefits due to an allegedly protectionist environmental trade
63
measure.1
Conflicting estimates of environmental damage result not only from
scientific uncertainty, but also from politics.... One way to narrow the
range of estimates is to entrust research to scientists perceived to be
neutral and objective.... [N]on-governmental
organizations (NGOs)
64
can play an important role in this respect.1

After coming to a decision, the Dispute Settlement Body can use
NGOs to monitor compliance. "NGOs are often quite effective in
investigating and publicizing transgressions." 16 5 Finally, the
Dispute Settlement Body might consider allowing NGOs to submit amicus briefs in cases that have environmental
implications.

166

160. Garner, supra note 14, at 1080.
161. For details on the various councils and committees of the WTO, see
WTO Charter, supra note 1.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
163. International law generally will provide compensation for environmental damage upon the presentation of precise evidence of loss. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3,203-04 (July 25) (stating that the Court
will award compensation only upon a concrete submission regarding the existence and amount of each damage). See generally Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1941) (states must
prove damages by documenting an actual difference in the value of its property
before and after the harm).
164. Developments, supra note 75, at 1532 (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 1606.
166. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Professor Shelton discussed some of the advantages that amici have over full participation:
[An amicus] is generally less costly and time consuming than mounting
a full case, allowing the organization to share the litigation burden
with the parties; amici are not bound by the decision and not prevented
from relitigating issues in the case should the holding be unfavorable;
unlike experts or witnesses, they generally may raise any issue the
court could raise on its own motion and are not limited by questions
presented to them or to matters pleaded by the parties....
Shelton, supra note 21 at 611.
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The greatest opposition addressing both trade and the environment in the same context will most likely come from developing countries. 16 7 This is partly because environmental issues
are not of the same importance to developing countries as they
are to wealthier ones. 168 But the issues are inextricably linked,
since a higher standard of living enables greater care for the environment. 16 9 The approach that needs to be taken toward the
environment is one that recognizes the divergent needs and pri170
orities between nations at different stages of development.
Developing countries tend to resist international participation by NGOs. This is based on an incorrect assumption that
NGOs only reflect the concerns and interests of developed countries. 17 ' This may be due to the fact that "'monolithic' states
have genuine difficulties in understanding the operations of
more pluralistic societies, and the fact that many NGOs grew up
in an age of imperialism and mainly in 'imperialist' countries
taints them in the eyes of some elements in countries which formerly were dependent territories." 72 Contrary to this notion,
NGOs often expose the problems created by the governments of
developed countries.17 3 In fact, many NGOs are devoted to lobbying the governments of developed countries and educating
them about the problems of developing countries. 7 4 A more
likely reason that some governments are opposed to NGO participation (but one that is harder for them to admit) is that NGOs
generally represent minority views. These views are otherwise
167. Developing countries were strongly opposed to the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade. See supra note 43.
168. See Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries The Developing Countries?,23 ENVTL. L. 705 (1993).

169. Id. at 706. This is not to say, however, that if societies attain economic
growth, all will be well with the environment. Id.
170. Id. at 706-07.
171. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 259. This idea is especially misguided concerning the environment. Since environmental hazards are not limited to national boundaries, NGOs that are concerned with the environment necessarily
have an interest in environmental problems worldwide.
172. Id. at 263.
173. Id. In fact, more and more NGOs from developing countries are participating on the international level. For example, the 1986 FAO Development Education Exchange Papers contain contributions from NGOs in Canada, France,
Peru, India, Zaire, the Philippines, Australia and Columbia. Id. at 264.
174. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3251. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at
263.
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not heard on the international level, and all governments tend
17 5
to find them unwelcome at one time or another.
In order to be most effective on the international level, developed and developing country NGOs need to be mutually dependent on one another. 176 This mutual dependency manifests
itself in a form of partnership that has been quite effective internationally. One example of this is the partnership between the
Sri Lankan NGO, Environmental Foundation, Ltd. (EFL) and
the U.S. NGO, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC).' 77 In response to a much criticized proposal for a forestry loan to Sri Lanka, EFL and NRDC formed a partnership to
encourage the World Bank to reconsider the loan. Drawing on
the political connections of NRDC and the local knowledge and
expertise of EFL, the two groups were able to persuade the
World Bank to delay formal consideration of the loan, and permit further investigation. They were successful in getting both
the United States and Sri Lankan governments to express serious reservations about the proposed loan, and finally were able
to condition the loan on public scrutiny of its implementation.1 78
Ironically, despite initial hostility to the two NGOs, the World
Bank later cited this loan as one of its best.1 7 9
The partnership model is effective because NGOs complement each other's strengths and weaknesses. Because of their
experience and financial backing, developed country NGOs tend
to be stronger lobbyists at the international level.18 0 On the
other hand, because they have a direct stake in the outcome of
policy decisions, developing country NGOs have a better per-

175.

WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 264. This phenomenon was noted at the

World Bank, "NGOs often are part of the political opposition in Third World
countries, and many governments balk at involving rival elements in their economic planning." Stokes, supra note 27, at 3252.
176. See Wirth, supra note 26, at 2645 (1991).
177. See id. at 2655-56.
178. Based on their success, EFL and NRDC have entered into a formal relationship to examine in broad terms Sri Lanka's national energy needs and
policies, as well energy alternatives in the Third World generally. Id. at 2656.
179. There have been many successful examples of the partnership model.
A similar coalition, for example, was able to achieve passage of legislation requiring U.S. representatives to the World Bank to seek greater participation by
NGOs in Bank activities. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3251.
180. "Ironically, American environmental organizations often have far
greater leverage than the real stakeholders, members of the public in developing countries. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2652.
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spective on local environmental problems, 181 and have an appearance of legitimacy when lobbying multinational
organizations. 1 82 The WTO should encourage such partnerships, since this indirect form of participation "is often a more
effective mechanism for developing country activists to achieve
183
their goals than dialogue with their own governments."
IV. CONCLUSION
"While it appears that most nations recognize that
'[elnvironmental issues are best handled with the participation
of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level,' the law of international environmental protection does not yet recognize that,
increasingly, the relevant level is a global one." 1 84 NGOs can
provide a voice for citizens, who are otherwise excluded from
most international participation, and help to overcome the differences between environmental and free trade advocates. Furthermore, by allowing for NGO observation of WTO
deliberations, the problem of transparency will be overcome.
NGOs have proven their effectiveness in IGOs, particularly
with regard to the environment. Whether the WTO utilizes
some form of the U.N. three-tiered model for NGO participation,
or whether it adopts its own system, there are many ways in
which NGOs can make valuable contributions to the work of the
WTO. The creation of the WTO has ushered in a new era for
world trade in the twenty-first century. By taking advantage of
the new provision which allows for NGO participation, this new
era can be a green one.

181. "[Jludging the merits of a particular advocacy goal or strategy in its
own legal, social, political, and economic context requires the perspective provided by a foreign counterpart." Id. at 2659.
182. "A close relationship with those who hold a direct stake in policy decisions gives the United States-based organization stature and credibility that it
would not have if it were representing purely American interests." Id.
183. Id. Moreover, NGO partnerships can significantly increase the economic strength of developing countries both through improvements in efficiency, and direct financial assistance. "Through improvements in efficiency
and conservation, developing countries could avoid at least $1.4 trillion in
power supply expansion costs between now and the year 2008." Id. at 2657.
Moreover, as of 1988, Western NGOs were donating more than $4.4 billion annually to developing countries. Stokes, supra note 27, at 3251.
184. Rubinton, supra note 15, at 485 (citing Draft of EnvironmentalRules:
'Global Partnership',N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at 10).

